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A. C. OF S., G-2, DA

TAB "A"

OFFICE OF A C OF S, G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-32 - THE
COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IN KOREA AND ITS EFFECT
ON SINO-SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION IN THE FAR EAST

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I. WHAT IS THE PRESENT NORTH KOREAN-CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION
IN KOREA?A. What is the strength of Chinese Communist and North Korean forces
now engaged in the Korean operation?

	<u>Immediately Engaged</u>	<u>Capable of Intervention</u>	<u>Total in Korea</u>
CCF	145,000	148,000	293,000
NKPA	50,000	193,000	243,000
Total	195,000	341,000	536,000

B. What have been their estimated losses to date in men and equipment
in terms of?(1) Personnel (as of 10 Feb)

	<u>Battle Casualties</u>	<u>Non-Battle</u>	<u>PWs</u>	<u>Total</u>
CCF	185,000*	22,000	912	208,000
NKPA	255,000	39,000	136,916	431,000
Total	420,000	61,000	137,828	619,000

The original North Korean Army, well trained and equipped by the Soviets was decimated by the UN forces just prior to the Chinese Communist intervention. Appreciable numbers of the best Chinese Communists have become casualties. However, it is not believed that the majority of the Chinese Communist casualties have been from among their best forces.

* As of 16 Feb 51

Review of this document by CIA has determined that
☒ CIA has no objection to declass
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 interest that must remain
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(2) Equipment?

The North Korean forces lost a majority of their arms and equipment when they were routed after the Inchon landing. This amounted to the bulk of the equipment for some 15 divisions and about the entire initial stock of tanks and self-propelled guns.

Chinese losses have been confined largely to small arms and mortars.

C. What is their present reserve strength in terms of

(1) Trained manpower in Korea?

All trained manpower in Korea is included in the organized forces.

(2) Trained manpower in Manchuria and elsewhere in China?

Manchuria - Chinese Field Forces - 368,000

Military District Troops - 370,000

China (excluding Manchuria) - Chinese Field Forces and
135

Military District Troops - 2,488,000.

(3) Arms, equipment, and logistical support?

There are no significant reserves of equipment in North Korea other than those in the hands of troops. Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria are believed to be equipped on at least the same scale as those in Korea and to have fairly sizable reserve stocks including a large number of combat aircraft. The Soviet Union possesses in the Far East adequate supplies for a greatly increased program of support to Communist forces in Korea.

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D. What are the chief limitations on the use of this reserve?

The difficulties of supply and movement within Korea are the chief limitations on the use of this reserve. It would be extremely difficult to supply a larger force logistically and, with better operational weather for the UN air forces, these difficulties will be increased materially.

E. What has been and is the nature and extent of Soviet material support to

(1) The North Koreans?

Soviet aid to the North Korean armed forces has been similar in nature to that provided the Satellite armies of Eastern Europe. To date the amount of heavy equipment, particularly tanks and motor vehicles, has been limited. For example, while as many as 500 tanks and SP guns were initially available to the North Koreans, losses have apparently not been replaced. While there has been a continuing supply of other motor vehicles to the North Koreans present extremely limited evidence suggests that attrition has exceeded resupply. All artillery appears to be of Soviet design and manufacture. Small arms are mostly of Soviet design and many of them of Soviet manufacture. Small arms ammunition, mortars and some small arms have been produced in Manchurian and Korean factories.

Other necessary supplies, particularly POL and technical equipment, are largely of Soviet origin.

(2) The Chinese Communists?

Soviet support to the Chinese forces has, to date, been demonstrably limited. While aircraft have been made available in considerable

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numbers, the presence of Soviet artillery or vehicles has not been confirmed in the Chinese forces in Korea in significant numbers. On the other hand, there is evidence that fuel, some small arms and certain minor items of equipment have been provided. It is known that some Chinese divisions have been or are being reequipped with Soviet materiel. The extent of this program, or the intended employment of these divisions in Korea is not known.

F. What are the present Communist capabilities for

- (1) Conducting military operations designed to drive the UN from Korea?

Communist forces are now equipped and without the use of sea and air forces are incapable of driving the UN forces from Korea.

- (2) Fighting a war of attrition?

The Communist forces in Korea are capable of fighting a war of attrition for an indefinite period.

II. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN AFFECTED COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST?

A. Have Chinese Communist and North Korean losses to date been such that they

- (1) May have forced a curtailment of operations planned for the Korean Campaign?

Losses to date have evidently interfered with Communist plans for the Korean campaign.

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- (2) May have hampered Chinese Communist capabilities for coping with internal forces hostile to Peiping?

Chinese Communist losses in Korea to date, and deployment of large numbers of Field Forces away from other areas, have not yet materially affected the government's capability to cope with internal dissident elements.

- (3) May have curtailed, canceled, or deferred operations possibly planned against Taiwan, Tibet, Indo-China, Burma or Japan?

It is doubtful that Chinese losses to date have affected Peiping's possible plans of aggression against these areas. It is believed, however, that failure to act against them has been due in part to China's Korean commitments.

- (4) May have strained or disrupted the domestic economy of China?

Losses of Chinese equipment in Korea have been comparatively light. Manpower losses in killed have not been heavy enough to be severely felt. Treatment of wounded has overtaxed medical and hospital facilities although not otherwise affecting China's domestic economy. Support of the Korean campaign has affected the economy, particularly by straining the transportation system.

- (5) May have constituted a significant drain on Soviet resources and Logistical capabilities?

Operations in Korea have, to date, undoubtedly not constituted a significant drain upon either Soviet resources or Soviet logistic capabilities. It is considered that the Soviets will not accept any significant reduction of their own military potential through the operations of Satellite forces. The fact that equipment is being made available suggests that the Soviets

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have largely realized the goals set for their own forces and can spare a part of new production in other operations without jeopardizing what they consider to be their own present and future requirements.

B. Would continued Chinese-Korean operations in Korea on the present scale be likely to

(1) Affect the Chinese Communist problem of coping with hostile internal forces?

If operations in Korea are prolonged to the extent of requiring further large numbers of Chinese Communist Field Forces to be withdrawn from internal areas as replacements, leaving internal security to the Military District troops, a serious reduction in the government's capabilities to control dissident elements will result.

(2) Curtail, defer, or cancel operations possibly planned against Taiwan, Tibet, Indo-China, Burma, or Japan?

China's commitment in Korea will continue to operate to defer or reduce her possible plans of aggression against these areas. Pressure from Soviet Russia or other overriding considerations, however, might be the deciding factor in such a decision.

(3) Strain or disrupt the domestic economy of China?

Continued support of the Korean campaign will further strain China's transportation system and eventually become a serious burden to her limited industrial resources.

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(4) Cause a significant reduction of Soviet resources?

It is considered that as long as Soviet support of operations on the present scale continues, this in itself will be a good indication that the Soviets do not consider the venture a significant drain on their resources. On the contrary, it seems clear that the Soviets have the intention of causing a drain on Western resources through continued limited objective attacks on areas of Western weakness. It follows that so long as the Soviets consider that the cost in terms of their logistic capabilities is outweighed by the reduction in Western potential, the Korean operation will continue.

III. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT OF THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN ON COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST?

A. Is there any reason to suppose that the Communists have modified their announced intentions to drive UN forces from Korea?

Communist propaganda continues to indicate that the objective is to drive the UN forces from Korea.

B. If the Communists concluded that under existing conditions they would be unable to drive the UN forces from Korea, would they:

(1) Withdraw their Chinese "volunteers" and if so how and to what points?

It is most unlikely that the Chinese Communists would withdraw their forces. Only a negotiated settlement on their own terms or a decisive defeat by the UN forces would result in the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from Korea.

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- (2) Prolong the Korean fighting as long as possible in an effort to drain US resources and create further dissension among the UN Allies?

It is in line with Soviet policies, to which Peiping presumably subscribes, to prolong the Korean fighting as long as possible for the reasons indicated.

- (3) Seek a negotiated settlement?

A negotiated settlement on their own terms might be sought.

- (4) Call upon the USSR to invest further additional aid?

Doubtless the Chinese Communists are already calling upon the USSR for further aid. They will most certainly continue to do so if the situation does not improve.

- (5) Launch military operations elsewhere?

Other considerations than a stalemate in Korea will probably dictate the decision for military operations elsewhere.

- C. If the Communists became convinced that the Chinese position in Korea was becoming untenable, would they

- (1) Withdraw and if so how and to what points?

The Chinese Communists are unlikely to withdraw from Korea unless forced to do so by superior military force.

- (2) Seek a negotiated settlement?

Up to this point they would be likely to seek a negotiated settlement upon their own terms. After their position becomes untenable it must be apparent to them that they would have no grounds upon which to seek a settlement on other than UN terms.

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(3) Call upon the USSR to intervene?

At the point where the Chinese position in Korea had become untenable, the Chinese Communists would probably seek from the USSR every assistance short of intervention, but would probably anticipate that open intervention on the part of the Soviets would result in global war with the consequent bombing of Chinese cities.

(4) Launch major military operations elsewhere?

Other considerations than a defeat in Korea would be the determining factor in a decision to launch a major military operation elsewhere. Having been burned once by pulling Soviet Russia's chestnuts out of the fire, the Chinese Communists would be reluctant to become involved in another venture outside their boundaries that might have the same outcome. However, Soviet pressure might be strong enough to force the issue.

D. Have there been any recent signs that the Chinese Communists may now be willing to negotiate?

There have been no indication that the Chinese Communists are willing to negotiate on other than their own previously announced terms.

E. What appear to be present Soviet intentions with respect to Korea?

(1) Would the USSR be likely to intervene openly if

- (a) It became clear that the Chinese Communists could not expel the UN from Korea?
- (b) A long stalemate appeared probable?
- (c) A Communist expulsion from Korea were likely?

At the present time there are no firm indications that the USSR intends to intervene openly in Korea. However, it must be noted that the Soviet Union

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has forces in the Far East adequate to intervene in Korea on a large scale and that these forces could be deployed for aggressive action against the UN forces with little or no warning.

It is believed unlikely that the Soviets would intervene openly in Korea if it became clear to them that the Chinese Communists would not expel the UN forces. In this case, it is believed that the Soviet reaction more probably would be to increase their assistance to the Communist forces by means short of actual open intervention.

Neither is it believed likely that the Soviets would intervene openly if a long stalemate in Korea appeared probable. Considerable evidence indicates that the Soviets do not desire an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea. The Soviets probably consider that a long stalemate in Korea would benefit the Communist world-wide position by weakening the West economically, causing a maldistribution of Western military forces and a drain on Western military resources, and decreasing Western will to resist further limited Communist aggression.

At the present time it is impossible to forecast what the Soviet reaction would be if a Communist expulsion from Korea appeared probable. However, in view of recent statements by Soviet leaders, including Stalin, there would be a distinct possibility of open Soviet intervention.

- (2) How have military developments in Korea affected and how are they likely to affect Sino-Soviet relations?

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There are no indications that military operations in Korea to date have adversely affected Sino-Soviet relations. Further, there is little likelihood that future military operations in Korea will adversely affect Sino-Soviet relations unless the Chinese Communists suffer a major defeat and come to believe that the Soviet Union has abandoned them or is about to do so.

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